This article argues that the Security Dilemma can in fact be abolished by integrating the militaries into one common global organisation, possibly under one common command. The existence and workings of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are an approximate example of this ideal in a geographically limited space. For illustrating this argument, this article discusses the logic of the Prisoners Dilemma, as the intellectual model underlying the Security Dilemma, and proposes an alternative version of the Prisoners Dilemma. It is then argued that the Security Dilemma only persists in a politically and economically ever farther integrated world because the international militaries are not integrated and hence partial anarchy persists at least in the military realm. The solution to remaining international conflicts, such as arguably one between NATO and Russia recently, would be to expand NATO to include "threatening" states' militaries until all militaries are joined in a global organisation, a truly global NATO. Finally, revised non-violent functions for NATO, as well as a global welfare state and an early warning system for civil wars, are proposed and discussed.
Introduction
Realism and Liberalism have been in opposition since the inception of the discipline of International Relations in 1919.
1 Realism traditionally focuses on power, struggles for security and survival, and the "hard" part of politics. 2 Liberalism, or Idealism or Utopianism, as they were originally termed, 3 instead focuses on democracy, trade, and international institutions. 4 Both approaches seem irreconcilable. However, on a second look, they are not. Realism and Liberalism are sometimes combined in theory -so, for example, the Institutionalist approach and the English School claim to be located at the intersection between the Realist and Liberal approach 5 -and in apply insights from other approaches, such as Institutionalism and Liberalism, as well as Marxism and Constructivism, to overcome the limitations of Realism as a singularity.
This article will argue that one way of abolishing the Security Dilemma would be to integrate the militaries of the world into one common organisation. This would in essence mean to expand NATO to include the militaries of states that seem to threaten us (i.e., the original members of NATO) or that NATO originally was supposed to defend against, and finally all militaries. One such first step could be to integrate Russia into NATO. 17 This, it is here argued, would logically abolish the Security Dilemma, at least in the former case between Russia on the one hand, and the USA and Europe on the other. If the militaries would be integrated into one common organisation, such as NATO, they would not pose a threat to each other anymore. NATO is a defence community, 18 and at present within NATO it is believed that the Security Dilemma is not active. 19 Hence, IR scholars could argue that within NATO the Security Dilemma is abolished. Expanding NATO to include more countries, and in particular those that seem a potential threat, such as Russia, could abolish still existing Security Dilemmata. To make this result even stronger, the global NATO should later on be put under a common command, which would also long-term necessitate a world state that needs to be accompanied by a globally directly elected parliament, a global welfare state, and (at least in theory) a world government, 20 in addition to the beneficial institutions and processes already present.
This article will first discuss what is known about the Security Dilemma in the literature to show that it exists primarily because of the (partial) condition of anarchy and the lack of integration of militaries. 21 It will here also propose a revised version of the original Prisoners Dilemma, the latter of which has been taken as an illustration of the underlying logic in the Security Dilemma, and which is based on partially revisable assumptions, in particular if IR scholars want to apply it to international relations. Based on the new model, this article will argue that, for integrating actors, such as militaries, and bringing them to peace, it is not necessary to have a common threat, it is also possible to integrate actors based on a common project that they can only solve jointly, 22 as well as by creating common authorities. Connected to this, the article will here also present challenges to the theorem of "tit for tat," 23 which is believed to be at least in part culturally determined and might not present the only or necessarily most successful strategy for creating cooperation.
The second part of this article will present some ideas on how to apply these theoretical concepts in practice, for example with steps to creating a global, or at least more global, NATO by including Russia, and by starting a process towards more global integration by discussing a global United Nations Parliament 24 and presenting the idea of a Global Welfare State 25 and an Early Warning System for conflicts based on global mental health data. 26 All of the latter are thought necessary to avoid conflicts stemming from inequalities, oppression, or other known causes for conflict that exist apart from the Security Dilemma. 27 These additional causes are more important for understanding intra-national and transnational conflicts, as the most common conflicts in today's world, rather than the Security Dilemma itself. They need to be addressed likewise to avoid traditional international conflicts developing out of them. This part of the article will also discuss the risks that the arguments in here entail and a reflection that the here proposed arguments might be useful in times of crises, but are not necessarily necessary, but probably beneficial, in times of peace.
The Security Dilemma
The term "Security Dilemma" had been coined by John H. Herz. In Political Realism and Political Idealism 28 he describes the Security Dilemma as a psychological artefact: he calls it the "kill or perish" dilemma, similar to the "fight or flight" syndrome, 29 and he proposes that competition for security derives out of it. 30 John Herz connected the Security Dilemma to the individual. Since then, however, much of the writing on the Security Dilemma explains it with the fundamental condition of anarchy in the international system. 31 Furthermore, it is explained with the "military preparations" of states that, even if defensive, threaten other states and create a situation of uncertainty and mutual fear. Herbert Butterfield, likewise, related the Security Dilemma to the individual and explained it with "universal sin of humanity," 32 an idea that later became key in Ken
Booths and Nicholas Wheelers work. 33 Later on, the Security Dilemma was adopted in the Realist parlance, and today is mainly understood as the tension between states that exists because, in the absence of overarching authority, states at least potentially threaten each other always. As Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler write:
… the military preparations of one state create an unresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether those preparations are for defensive purposes only (to enhance its security), or whether they are for offensive purposes (to weaken another's security) 34 These military preparations and the insecurity that derives are thought to be responsible for arms races and finally military conflict, as soon as crisis occurs. This aspect will be discussed further below. It is first necessary to look at the underlying theoretical models explaining the incentive structure that causes the Security Dilemma.
Kenneth Waltz, in Theory of International Politics, 35 discussed the Security Dilemma only briefly.
He refers to the ideas of John Herz and maintains that in a bipolar constellation it is easier to deal with the Security Dilemma than in a multipolar constellation in the international system. He does not mention unipolarity. He refers to second strike capability and the deterrence function of nuclear weapons as providing security in this dilemma, which he believes cannot be solved, only dealt with. His ideas will be tackled further below and revised.
John Mearsheimer mentions the Security Dilemma in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. 36 He also refers back to John Herz, but his interpretation of this dilemma is that the best strategy in this dilemma is an offensive posturing ("The best defense is a good offense"). He admits, however, that this does not solve the dilemma, only serves as a strategy to survive within it (which is doubtable given the presence of nuclear weapons) and also admits that the dilemma will persist as long as anarchy persists, a point that will be tackled in this paper.
Robert Jervis in Perception and Misperception in International Politics
37 argues that the Security Dilemma derives out of real or illusory incompatibility of interests and promotes shared values and interests as the solution. He also maintains that the Security Dilemma cannot be abolished as long as anarchy persists.
Randall Schweller refers to inequality and struggles about the distribution of power as a cause for the Security Dilemma. 38 This is more intensively discussed in Beyer, 39 however, it is here believed that this is rather a cause of than the Security Dilemma itself in the general understanding.
In another seminal 1978 article in World Politics, Robert Jervis applied the Prisoners Dilemma to international relations, hence implicating that the Prisoners Dilemma symbolises the Security Dilemma, at least in part. 40 The Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) is actually a good illustration of the underlying logic in the Security Dilemma as traditionally understood. In the PD, in its original form, two criminals get caught by the police. They are kept in separate cells, so that they cannot communicate. Each are told that if they confess first, they will go free (receive an amnesty) and the other one will get a heavy sentence. To avoid a heavy sentence, and because they both cannot trust that the other won't take advantage first, they will both confess. This results in a suboptimal outcome for them, as two prisoners confessing is of course good for the police, but not good for them. Both will, according to the game, receive a sentence. However, in the original version, if both could have trusted each other and both remained silent, they still would have received a sentence, even if a lighter one than if both confessed. So, for each of them, the best outcome would not have been to remain both silent, but to confess first. 41 Let me present a revised version of the PD: two criminals get caught by the police. Both of them are imprisoned separately. They are told that if they confess before their companions, they receive a lighter sentence. If the other companion confesses first, they receive a heavier sentence. If they both confess, they also receive the heaviest sentence. But if they both remain silent, and collaborated henceforth to work for legal and benign purposes, they cannot be held in prison. The important argument here is that they were told that both would not be held in prison if they collaborated and committed to work for mutual and general gain (i.e., the common good), of course without committing further crimes. The ideal outcome for them, in this game, would be that they both cooperated. In that case, they could both achieve freedom without punishment. The ideal, and expected, outcome would be CC (cooperate-cooperate) over DC (defect-cooperate), or CD or DD. Cooperation then is simply achieved by retaining the joint institution -the prison authority -and changing incentives.
Therefore, I argue that the original representation of the PD in fact has a mistake: It assumes and presents one-sided defection (DC) to be the best outcome for actor A. 49 However, this is a mis-guided and misguiding assumption. In fact, the assumptions of the original Prisoners Dilemma are quite dangerous, as they imply that winning by sacrificing the other prisoner is a rational strategy. If, however, DC would result in a worse outcome for A than CC, this would have fundamental implications for our thinking about cooperation. It would mean that cooperation generally becomes more likely than exploitation, and this would bring forth much higher probabilities for cooperation to occur naturally. The challenge then would be to just create appropriate incentives for cooperation in security to abolish the Security Dilemma, as well as retaining and strengthening common institutions that can set these incentives. 50 Furthermore, the PD in itself is only partially appropriate for explaining the Security Dilemma, as indeed it does assume a common authority in existence (in this case the prison authority). The Security Dilemma, however, is believed to be in existence mainly in situations of anarchy, hence where a common authority is missing. 51 The latter applies in the situation between the "West" and Russia, as an example of a possible Security Dilemma situation in the real world, where the highest authority is the Security Council in which both the US and Russia are equals in power, hence there is no superior authority present. Joseph Schwartzberg: Transforming the United Nations System.
In its application to international relations, according to Jervis, the revised game would more likely apply if the defence has the advantage. 52 In that case, offensive capability is to be avoided.
This increases the security of both states (if we assume a 2 person game, or a situation of bipolarity, as in the Cold War). 53 The logic then becomes more similar to the Stag Hunt game: In the Stag Hunt, according to Rousseau, all members of a group have the most beneficial outcome if they cooperate to hunt a stag (CC). However, as it is not certain that they will be able to catch a stag this particular day, any single individual will be tempted to defect from the general hunt and chase a hare instead. This will be better for the individual than no hunting result at all, but will be worse for the group, as the group can successfully hunt the stag only if all members cooperate. 54 The principal logic of this game favours CC over CD, but with a condition that it is not certain that CC will bring a beneficial outcome, depending on if a stag will appear. This risk is the incentive for any of the group members to defect and chose CD instead. 55 In the revised PD, the outcome CC is more certain, however, the stag will appear and cooperation will happen.
The Stag Hunt game can be applied better to disarmament talks than arms races. While all countries might believe that the world would be a safer one, for example without nuclear weapons, it is difficult to achieve disarmament because each country fears that the overall goal of a nuclear free world might not be achievable because general cooperation will not come about. Without the trust in the achievability of the overall better outcome, to be achieved by general multilateral cooperation (CC), cooperation is not going to be achieved and CD, DC or DD will be the result. The necessary trust is thought to be possibly be achieved by creating common institutions who protect the rights and enforce the duties of the members, such as is provided within a functioning state, hence as in my revised PD. Therefore, my revised PD could have implications not only for hard core Security Dilemmata, but also for creating cooperation in international affairs more widely.
Further below I will explain how the integration of the militaries, maybe under one common command, would allow for addressing the problem of international warfare and the possibility of abolishing nuclear weapons.
The revised PD that I presented above indicates that it is not in the self-interest of the prisoners to defect (which is the original assumption of the PD), but that it is in their self-interest to cooperate. 56 It is therefore more similar to the Stag Hunt than to the original PD, with the difference that the overall better outcome can in fact be securely achieved if mutual cooperation would come about (i.e., the stag can be caught).
What evidence is there that CC is better for both actors than CD or DC?
In international relations, defection is usually thought of as an armed attack, or a foreign intervention, in our times. This raises the question if one state is better off attacking another one and securing control over another state, or if it is better of engaging in peaceful foreign policies, such as trade, with the other state. The answer is obvious. However, if under attack, winning a war is better than losing a war. However, is winning a war and attacking first against weak defences really better than not engaging in a war at all and remaining in peaceful relations with the other state, and, for example, trading? Most argue that war in itself is costly, 57 and not beneficial to the warring state, even if colonies or -in our present time -friendly democratic regimes -might be gained by war. 58 As the international community has seen, for example in Afghanistan and Iraq, an interventionist strategy often desperately fails. 59 On the other hand, successful democratisation has been achieved historically more successfully by, or at least by the inclusion of, soft means (CC), such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, which was not inspired mainly or solely by the increase in arms expenditure of the US, but more so by the joint cooperation in the form of the Helsinki accords, which inspired the desire for and belief in change in the Eastern populations 60 and probably Gorbachev also.
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Furthermore, war in times of nuclear weapons is simply potentially too destructive to support any justification for it whatsoever. The original PD was developed in the Cold War era when nuclear deterrence was at its height. However, as Kenneth Waltz himself indicated, 62 mutual deterrence, such as exemplified in Mutually Assured Destruction, 63 does not necessarily provide absolute safety. If mutual deterrence (Mutually Assured Destruction, MAD) fails, which is at least a theoretical possibility, DD becomes the worst outcome, and CD or DC are not far behind. In terms of nuclear weapons or a conflict between Russia and "the West" it could mean the complete annihilation of humanity. Russia possibly adopted a "first strike" doctrine in 2010, 64 provides over the second largest arsenal of nuclear weapons in the world, and the historical record -Napoleon and Hitler -shows that it is not advisable to start war with Russia. Furthermore, with many of the "low politics" problems that the international community is facing today, for example climate 56 There might still be barriers to cooperation, but they might not necessarily be only lack of trust, they can also stem from a desire to revenge or other causes. These motivations, too, however, can be addressed by the changed incentives and a common authority. Defection, even if beneficial in the short run, turns out to become less optimal in iterated PDs, as revenge action in the form of future defection by the other side and punishment for former defection needs to be feared. Iterated PDs make cooperation rational. In addition, it could be argued that cooperation is the human default choice. 68 Defections, such as aggression, seems normally to occur due to negative "impacts" such as threats, fear, traumata, or unmet needs, or even simply unfulfilled expectations (frustrations), according to Psychology.
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In the original PD, each player is enticed to exploit (defect) the other for its own gain. Successful exploitation is the maximum winning strategy (DC), while the normal equilibrium will be that both players attempt to exploit each other, this will mean an outcome of DD. 70 In the revised PD, exploitation, even if successful (DC instead of DD), is not the winning strategy. It has the second best outcome only. The winning strategy in the revised PD is CC. 71 In the revised PD, the only problems to overcome to achieve the mutual winning strategy are issues of trust, 72 communication, coordination and time pressures and capability to solve complex cooperation problems. It would be assumed that in the revised PD both sides are willing to cooperate, and what is remaining as inhibitors of cooperation might be structural and individual constrains. The problem becomes less one of "self-interest" in power maximisation, as in Realism, 73 and more one of mutual management, communication and coordination, which require supranational institutions.
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Supranational institutions are necessary for providing a safety net for cooperation, and they are necessary for facilitating coordination, setting incentives and rules, and for monitoring, as well as for solving disputes, if they occur. The challenge then simply becomes one of creating supranational institutions and creating integration. The most promising approach towards creating joint institutions has been put forth with the writings on Security Communities and Institutionalism.
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The logic of the revised PD as presented above is also understood by Booth and Wheeler, who propose that "trust," not self-interest, would therefore be a solution to overcome the Security Dilemma, if it only could be achieved. 66 Principally, it can be stated that war is an evil that the whole discipline of International Relations was created to abolish, hence this argument that it needs to be avoided at all cost will be taken as a basic assumption here and not further discussed. 78 In the end, the "other minds problem"
means that people as well as states lack control over the other, and this threatens us potentially.
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Booth and Wheeler propose regimes, cooperation and trust for mitigating the SD. This means, to use a cooperative strategy even in the face of non-cooperation, as well as establishing institutions (regimes) that protect against being cheated. For looking further into this argument, IR scholars need to consider theories on cooperation further.
As Axelrod has shown in his research on the iterated PD, 80 the most effective strategy in cooperation games seems to be "tit for tat." In the anarchical condition, players fare best who generally cooperate, but who punish non-cooperation with non-cooperation (but not aggression) and then return to cooperation again. The forgiving player therefore is the most successful player. However, this effect apparently cannot be maximised by being always forgiving and never punishing. In fact, players who never punish (meaning defect once, not aggress) a defector will be exploited, Axelrod argues. The iterated PD however also illustrates that cooperation and trust have their important role: the most effective strategy of "tit for tat" necessitates to always cooperate, until the other side defects. This implies, so to speak, a strict "no first strike" strategy.
The problem of defection would then be abolished in case all players would comply with the most successful strategy always and if no other interfering factors would be present. Then no one would ever strike first, everyone would always cooperate. In practice, this could mean a general compliance with a "no first strike strategy," which would result in a higher likelihood of peaceful relations. 81 Furthermore, the function of punishment, if necessary, should be taken over by supranational authority. Furthermore, Buddhist logic challenges tit for tat, as it argues for accepting "defections" in the other side as a result of one's own past actions (i.e., karma) which can be better addressed by understanding and correcting past mistakes with present and future beneficial actions (i.e., atonement). 82 In essence, this means that there are even more arguments for beneficial action than the strategy of tit for tat. These can be applied in case tit for tat as a strategy fails. And it would be better to apply those strategies rather than to escalate an exchange in case tit for tat does not work. This is in line with Alan Collins idea on how to address some of the Security Dilemmata (SD) in their presentation in the real world: Alan Collins presents solutions for mitigating the SD in his 2004 article 83 : he presents different versions of the SD, which can be solved by various means.
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The first version of the SD is the system-induced SD. It exists because of anarchy, and therefore resembles most closely the classical idea of the SD. It represents a tragedy because even though neither actor intends harm to the other and both have compatible interests fear persists. Collins maintains that uncertainty is the main enabling factor for this SD. 81 President Obama announced a "no first strike" strategy for the US in 2016, along the lines of this argument.
82 Another option would be to go beyond tit for tat and apply more Christian inspired strategies, which allow for returning favours for harms done (i.e., "turning the other cheek"). While this might not be a successful strategy if it is always applied (it opens up room for exploitation and oppression, as long as no superior authority intervenes), it might possibly be a better strategy than tit for tat always. All of these approaches applied could mean a transition from Alexander Wendt's culture of anarchy (Hobbesian) to a culture of friendship (Kantian). 87 Interfering factors can occur, for example, simply by the number of interacting players in international relations and the practical difficulties this raises. Waltz discusses, to illustrate this, that multi-polarities are more conflict prone than bipolarities as there are more players and hence more interactions to consider. 88 This brings about problems of miscalculation and misinterpretation due to the sheer number of interactions and the complexity of the playing field. As Waltz already understood in Man, the State and War, global integration under one common authority with common rules would be one possible solution for this problem.
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In the state, to give an analogy, the problem of cooperation on the road between motorists is solved by creating norms and rules for driving, implementing these rules via education and signals, and enforcing them with the law and the police. 90 Interestingly, broadly these rules are complied with out of pure self-interest. Most drivers do comply with the traffic rules for fear of accidents. Drivers generally do not fear other drivers on the road, drivers usually trust broadly that they will comply with the traffic rules. Still, it is sensible to be cautious and alert when driving on the road. Those drivers that do not comply with the rules are usually punished by the authorities to bring them back towards compliance. 91 While therefore rules in themselves are beneficial for solving coordination problems, authorities are needed to enforce compliance of free riders. 92 This approach, within the state, helps keep coordination problems, such as in road traffic, to a minimum, even though it cannot prevent all accidents. Human errors and intervening factors, such as the weather, still create the potential for accidents. However, rules and norms in combination with an existing enforcing authority and a general willingness to cooperate in the population solve coordination problems on the road to a very large extent.
This is in line with additional thinking about how the PD can be transformed into a game that has coordination as the outcome. Snidal solves the PD with institutionalisation: "successful resolution of major PD problems will require a higher level of institutionalization than coordination problems." 93 He proposes to think about coordination problems, as an advancement from PD problems, in his 1997 article: "simple generalizations based on the PD model cannot be uncritically generalized to other situations." 94 This supports my idea that IR scholars have to progress from PD thinking to apply other models to international relations, such as the revised PD that I propose.
Social Psychology is one approach to mention to support the logic of the revised PD further. The Realistic Group Conflict Theory was developed by Sherif 95 to explain how conflicts of interest and competition over scarce resources create conflicts between groups. His theory was based on observations of boys in a summer camp. Two groups of boys were formed, and they were given competing tasks, which could only be won by one group. This created competition and a natural conflict of interest, and soon the two groups were in conflict with each other. However, Sherif also presented the solution to such a situation: Towards the end of the camp, the two groups of boys were given a task that they could only solve in cooperation. The groups overcame their previous opposition and cooperated, and at the end of the camp they went home without showing any conflicts between the two groups. Similarly, in International Relations, peace through integration and through joint projects is thought about by theorists of and is exemplified by the European Union. 96 Social Psychology therefore illustrates two things: first, it challenges Neorealism and the assumption that bipolarity is the most stable systemic condition 97 and second it shows how cooperation can be facilitated by a supranational authority providing correct incentives, such as is presented in my revised PD.
To give another analogy: within any functioning state, common SDs are usually reduced to a very low level. 98 The state, meaning in practice the police and the law, are protecting us from harm and citizens generally trust this protection to hold. Cooperation gets more common. However, if we, as IR theorists, combine this with the aforementioned Social Psychology approach, it is better to think of a firm or a business. Within a business, the common purpose or common project (usually to keep the business profitable) integrates individuals and makes cooperation the norm. While within the state individuals lack a common project (apart there be a period of high nationalism and patriotism), and hence cooperation is frequent but dependent on individual interest, in a firm with a joint project and a common authority (the management) cooperation becomes the general norm. In both the state and the firm, defection can be punished, which is the basic condition to create cooperation, or at least non-defection. In the state this means compliance with the law, in the firm this means business-conducive behaviour. So, a common authority with the monopoly of force, or rather the authority to create laws and the capability to punish their violation, is the minimal condition to ensure cooperation. A common project that can only be accomplished in cooperation creates the additionally required incentives for cooperation and makes cooperation even more abundant.
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Furthermore, the argument that the Security Dilemma can be solved by transforming anarchy into hierarchy has been pointed at by various authors, from John Herz to Robert Jervis to Tang Shiping: "Groups and individuals who live alongside each other without being organized into a higher unity … must be … concerned about their security" (Herz) ; "The heart of the security dilemma argument is that an increase in one state's security can make others less secure, not because of misperceptions or imagined hostility, but because of the anarchic context of international relations" (Jervis) , and "The ultimate source of the security dilemma is the anarchic nature of international politics." 100 Furthermore, Tang Shiping provides a more precise definition of the Security Dilemma than the ones previously provided, which includes the concepts anarchy, fear and the accumulation of defensive capabilities. 101 Defensive capabilities are thought to provide both a protection in such a situation as a risk, as they can be interpreted in offensive terms. Defensive (and offensive) capabilities are always to be thought of as the military power of any state. Therefore, one possibility of reducing the Security Dilemma posited by both anarchy and military capabilities would be to integrate the militaries of the world into one common organisation, such as is currently existing for the "West" with NATO. A common, truly global, NATO would arguably reduce or even abolish the SD between the participating states. For example, the SD is usually not conceptualised as existing between the current member states of NATO (as a security community 102 ), but it is rather applied to cases such as EU-Russia or in Asia, where NATO does not apply. 103 Similarly, balance of power mechanisms, which are only the systemic outcome of the underlying Security Dilemma politics, are generally thought to not apply to the integrated world of Europe or the "West." 104 It has also been argued that balance of power behaviour occurs only in conflictual and insecure relations, but can be abolished or at least reduced by making relations friendlier and mutually beneficial.
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Furthermore, Tang Shiping connects the Security Dilemma to conflicts of interest, both real and imagined. 106 In an integrated world, though, such as a democratic world state, conflicts of interest, both real and imagined, would not be solved with military arms races or wars, they would be solved by democratic means. In a democracy, say the UK, such conflicts are normally solved, or at least attempted to be solved, by democratic means, not by resort to brute force.
The argument proposed here is that the first step now -after the historic steps of political and economic integration (i.e., the UN, EU and other regions, global governance and globalisation), which should be continued -towards such integration would be the integration of the militaries into on global military alliance, on truly global NATO. The threat perception that ultimately creates the SD is stemming in essence from, as Booth and Wheeler argue, the military power of other states. Hence, it is the capability of "force" present in the militaries that creates the remaining mutual fear, more so than the political power. It is weapons, tanks and bullets that create fear, more so than leaders and diplomats. If these military capabilities were joined, this threat perception would arguably vanish and the Security Dilemma and war between states could arguably be abolished. This would not and should not mean the abolition of politics above the militaries. This is not an argument for a military world state. Instead, the argument here is that political and economic integration, as is already present with international institutions such as the UN and the EU and processes such as globalisation, needs to put on an integrated basis of joined military power.
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A global NATO in a world state and the abolition of nuclear weapons
For abolishing the Security Dilemma, hence, an integration of the militaries of the world into one common global NATO could be one solution. 108 The first step should be to integrate Russia into NATO by offering it conditional membership. This would mean that Russia could be a member, with all the benefits, as long as it would comply with the joint decisions (or abstain from joint actions, as currently some members do, but not act against them). It would have an equal say in the decisions, though, like all other members. In 1993, this option was first mentioned by Ronald Asmus, however he rejected it, like most of his contemporaries, with the justification that Russia was not ready and not sufficiently democratic yet. 109 Also, this possibility had been mentioned, but dismissed as unpractical and unwanted from both sides, in 2007 by Lionel Ponsard.
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Some recent crises between Russia and NATO are arguably related to the SD. The conflict in Ukraine, for example, can be explained at least partially with the threat that NATO poses towards Russia. Similarly, the shot-down plane MH17 and the Russian intervention in Syria, in which Russia did not seem to fight ISIS initially, but the rebel groups, and therefore acted in opposition to the Western interests, could possibly be explained by the Security Dilemma. 111 The intervention of Russia in this crisis resembled a crisis similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis, but was caused probably more by Russia trying also to solve the conflict, rather than to escalate it. It was lucky at this juncture that no war with Russia ensued, as this could have escalated into a global nuclear war. As Napoleon and Hitler had to learn, and as IR scholars very well know from the Cold War, it is advisable to avoid war with Russia. 112 In an article in International Relations, Beyer has argued that Russia and China might start to balance against the West if the West will not integrate them sufficiently into the new world order. 113 Arguably, the international community saw this happening in the last years with Russia. The explanation for this, at least in part, could be that Russia perceives a threat stemming from NATO, hence the West. 114 NATO is expanding towards the borders of Russia, and it is still configured as a defence community. So, obviously, Russia must see NATO as opposed to its interests. 115 It is possible that Russia, as well as potentially other countries now or in the future, would be revisionist states. 116 According to the here presented model, Such a move would strengthen the hand of responsible members of the French government against militant agitators, it would make the French feel less threatened and isolated, and it would enhance France's own sense of security. … In addition, by admitting France to their councils the allies would be in a position to exercise a certain amount of supervision and control over French policies.
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For the same reason, Germany was included into NATO originally. As Jean Monnet wrote in 1950 on how to prevent a future threat from Germany to the European states:
[T]he solution of the German problem in its military aspect [should] be sought in the same spirit and by the same methods as for coal and steel: the establishment of a European Army with a single High Command, a single organization, unified equipment and financing, and under the control of a single supranational authority (German units would gradually be integrated into this initial nucleus).
119
Countries that are possibly allied with Russia, 120 but considered by some as "rogue states," are also needing attention in the short term. The recent debate about Iranian nuclear weapons might possibly be superfluous, as it is possible that Iran already provides over nuclear capability from Russia, 121 but this is by far not certain. On the other hand, North Korea is a special case with a long history. Possibly, sanctions might have been used on North Korea for so long that they might have lost their effectiveness. And, contrary to Waltz, 122 states can probably be pushed into "suicidal mode" if just enough pressure is applied, and this then can increase the risk of nuclear war. Cooperation -negotiation and aid -are better options, but while they probably should be pursued intensively, they should be applied cautiously and persistently, similar to medical aid to an accident victim. Galtung mentioned the medical approach to peace before. 123 There must be immense fear and anger in North Korea due to decades of isolation and shame, which might result in sudden aggression if too much pressure is applied or due to other potential triggers. On the positive side, one could maybe put out a "catch" and promise North Korea something that they cannot resist. One could call this "buying them out." This should be in return for opening up and peacefully joining the international community. A possible promise could be that North Korea could be a second Japan in some decades or something similar, but the "West," or the international community for that matter, would need to stick to these promises to make them work.
Medium-term, NATO would need to integrate more states under its umbrella, as otherwise the current dilemma between Russia and NATO would only be transferred to other states, such as, for example, China. In essence, this would overall mean to replace the principle of "balance of power" with the principle of "division of labour" in military affairs and on a global level. This would need to continue until all militaries on a global level would be integrated into one organisation. A potential problem then would be how to come to joint decisions, if about 200 members would be included into the joint organisation. 131 were present and contributed substantially to these conflicts. It would therefore be essential, for avoiding future global war, to prevent the re-emergence of bipolar alliance systems. Multipolarities are possibly better, but only if strongly integrated under common institutions, as otherwise these are known to produce a high level of war. Unipolarities are relatively peaceful, but create resentment and frequent small wars. 132 All of these systemic constellations have their risks.
Multipolarities might split into bipolar alliance systems, for which strong supranational governance and integration is needed as a remedy. Unipolarities might become overburdened as well as create resentment. Here, also, supranational governance and integration are the solution.
Finally, it is theoretically difficult to decide for the theorist what a workable approach towards the creation of such truly global NATO would be. It is thinkable, however, that this would need to be approached with a long-term perspective, but also without procrastination, and employing intensive persuasion, in particular towards Russia, to accommodate many decades of "humiliation." Russia had asked for NATO membership early on after the end of the Cold War, 133 and probably the impossibility to achieve this goal while NATO expanded towards her borders might have contributed to tensions and feelings of humiliation.
A non-violent global NATO, a global welfare state and an early warning system
If IR scholars accept the proposition that joint projects can create cooperation between previously conflicting actors, politicians should find joint projects for the future global NATO. While "policing" would be one of its functions, 134 an important point to make here is that the ideal purpose of a future global NATO would be a non-violent one. 135 "Policing" could be understood to encompass functions such as those currently fulfilled by UN blue-helmets. It would be theoretically important to assign the future global NATO a non-violent role, as otherwise it would create a new security dilemma between the global NATO and the to-be-policed populations. 136 This would mean, the new conflict lines in such a new international system would not necessarily anymore be between different states, but between the global NATO and the global citizens. There is the resulting danger of tyranny and a global or transnational civil war or revolt. Terrorism and insurgencies are also possible occurrences in such a system. Like the police in, for example, a Western country, the global NATO should use non-violent methods to ensure compliance with the rules that apply to avoid creating or escalating such dangers.
In addition to the policing function, the global NATO could also take over emergency response functions, 138 such as those fulfilled by militaries already: aid for the recovery of a population after a natural disaster, for example. This function is already fulfilled by militaries in the present, and could become one of the major future functions for a global NATO (also keeping in mind that natural disasters, such as floods are predicted to increase in number with progressing climate change). Disaster relief could in the future also continue to encompass post-war reconstruction. Like the previous function, this function is already taken up by militaries today, such as NATO in Afghanistan. This, while it did not completely end terrorism in Afghanistan, at least prevented another 9/11. It is possible that this role could be strengthened. It would, of course, be necessary to combine this work of a reformed NATO with aid and reconstruction work by other entities, such as charities, NGOs, economic, industrial and financial actors, health providers etc.
Potentially, conflicts and aggression could even be ended by negotiations plus offering aid and reconstruction, 139 such as a "Marshall Plan for Syria," rather than engaging in fighting and deterrence. Such an approach should at least be tried, as it would certainly be a novel and probably much less harmful way of ending conflicts, if it works. It would be more in line with the above Christian and Buddhist principles, rather than "tit for tat." This approach would also resemble more a medical logic of addressing violence and aggression, 140 rather than a traditional political one. In addition to that, for addressing global poverty problems, which are at times also thought to contribute to intra-national or transnational violence, but which are a problem in themselves even without violence, a global state would need to include global development and redistributive and welfare functions. Hence in addition to foreign direct investment and globalisation what is needed is a "Global Welfare State."
To stay with the medical analogy, an Early Warning System for conflicts could be found in global mental health data. Previous research seems to indicate that it is possible that the general mental health of populations declines not only with conflict, but even before conflicts break out. 141 For example, a general increase in depressive illness in a population might indicate that violence of any form might occur following this. If this connection would be confirmed, it would be possible to use global mental health data as an early warning system for conflicts, which would allow to intervene with "soft" tools early on before a conflict breaks out. "Soft" measures to intervene could be of medical nature, and job creation, foreign direct investments, food supplies, support for minorities, or whatever is needed in a specific region for all round prosperity.
In the short term, a partially globalised NATO, such as one including Russia, could help disarming the fighting groups in Syria and as soon as possible provide intensive aid and reconstruction to war torn countries, such as Syria and other countries in the Middle East. 142 Intensive aid and reconstruction has helped pacify Germany after the Second World War, 143 and they are thought to be a remedy against future civil war and terrorism, as terrorism is thought to decrease at least against the donor country if foreign aid is given, and as civil wars tend to occur in countries below a certain developmental level. 144 A new version of a Marshall Plan applied at the countries of the Middle East that have experienced or are experiencing violence and civil strife could provide a remedy. 145 Such a plan could be a joint project between the members of the global NATO. A probable difficulty with such an approach would be military presence in affected countries: Robert Pape has shown that foreign military occupation is one of the major causes of suicide terrorism. 146 It is not known yet what could ameliorate this outcome. Possibly, making reconstruction and aid the main focus, instead of the military presence, could be helpful against this outcome. The main goal would need to be to rebuild war-torn countries and to bring prosperity, health and welfare to these countries, which would in turn facilitate a transition towards peace and good governance and democracy. 147 
Conclusion
This article has argued that it is in fact possible to abolish the Security Dilemma.
First, it argued that the underlying logic that is ascribed to the Security Dilemma with the Prisoners Dilemma game is misguided. Cooperation is much more beneficial and more to be expected than the Prisoners Dilemma assumes. A revised Prisoners Dilemma was presented to illustrate this point.
Furthermore, it has been a long-held belief that the Security Dilemma can only be mitigated, this article argues that in the discussion about the Security Dilemma already the possible solutions for its abolishment are presented. As it was argued here, the fundamental approach to abolish the Security Dilemma would be the transformation of an anarchic world into an international system that is marked by global hierarchy, hence a world state. However, to specify more how this approach would help solve the Security Dilemma, it was here pointed out that the militaries, which are the main factors responsible for the creation of the Security Dilemma under anarchy, need to be integrated. Integration of the militaries has already happened with the creation of NATO on a geographically limited basis. Therefore, this article argued for a further expansion of NATO and in particular the inclusion of states that are creating a Security Dilemma, such as Russia, but longer term also others, until all states are joined in one common military alliance.
The basis for this argument was the realisation that the main ingredient for the creation of the Security Dilemma in international affairs is not only the condition of abstract anarchy, as commonly presented in the literature, but also the existence of independent military establishments. While these are considered necessary due to the self-help nature of an anarchic world in the Realist perspective, in the Western world already the military establishments have integrated into NATO to abolish the Security Dilemma amongst them. While this can be seen as a mere alliance in the balance of power game that is played out in the international world, historically the creation of NATO was also a step to overcome a profound Security Dilemma at least within Europe that was responsible for the emergence of the two major wars that plagued the last century. Applying the lessons from the past to our times would mean to expand NATO to include not only friendly states but also states that seem a potential threat to the USA and Europe, such as Russia, and others, until all states are joined in a global alliance. As indicated above, Germany was originally integrated into NATO for particularly the reason to keep it pacified and under control. A similar outcome, it is hoped, would be achieved if the USA and Europe would integrate Russia into NATO now, with the long term perspective to create a truly global NATO.
Finally, this article proposes new cooperative approaches to solving conflicts, which serve as an inspiration for revised non-violent functions of NATO, in combination with other actors, to solve conflicts. In particular, it is argued that aid, reconstruction, negotiation and other cooperative approaches, including a global welfare state and an early warning system for war based on global mental health data, can help solve conflicts better than deterrence or traditional military intervention.
